The post-political literature -which equates 'the political' with insurgencies directed against the state -has only limited relevance for planning, focused as it is on the ways in which conflict is displaced from the functioning of the state apparatus. The post-political literature has however neglected a significant change in Alain Badiou's conceptualisation of the relation between the political and the state: the introduction of a political subject which acts from the within the statewhat he calls the state revolutionary. This figure, which makes 'evental' planning possible, is fleshed out through a Saint-Simonian reading of Haussmann's planning practice in his first years as Prefect of the Seine.
revolutionary). While the figure of the state revolutionary has been neglected by Badiou's proponents (Bassett, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2011) and critics alike (Hannah, 2016) , it has a lot to offer to those working on the politics of planning. This is because the figure of the state revolutionary complicates the consensus/conflict dichotomy that has crystallised opposition to the reception of the work of Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou (among others) in the social sciences -both of which draw a distinction between the everyday modifications that take place in parliamentary democracies and those moments in which the pursuit of equality brings about a significant reworking of the social order. This is a dichotomy that has been found to be unhelpful in that it obscures the myriad political practices that occur in between these two forms (Beveridge and Koch, 2017; Bylund, 2012; Hannah, 2016; Legacy, 2016) . The issue is that the reception of these ideas, drawn from interpretations of Rancière (Dikeç, 2005) and from more polemical texts by Badiou himself, has been accompanied by a 'fixing' of places: the democratic state is associated with consensus -through the operation of post-politics (Oosterlynck and Swyngedouw, 2010 ) -and that which lays outside of it with conflict in the form of urban political insurgencies (Dikeç and Swyngedouw, 2017) . The figure of the state revolutionary allows for an inversion of these 'placements': in events pushed forward by this type of subject, it is the state that becomes the vehicle of conflict and the outside which opposes the force of consensus. Badiou's work thus opens a new window in the debate on post-politics, one that pushes past the 'state phobia' that has characterised it thus far (Hannah, 2016) . It parallels Metzger's (2017) suggestion that the planning office could at times be the place of the political.
The theoretical contribution of Badiou's figure of the state revolutionary is fleshed out through a reading of Haussmann's early planning practice. While Haussmann oversaw the transformation of Paris between 1853 and 1870, his tenure can be split into two distinct periods: between 1853 and 1859, Haussmann drew on Saint-Simonian ideas to force through the entrenched influence of property owners over planning; after 1859, losses in the courts handed back planning power to property owners. Little is known of Haussmann's planning practice in the first period: contemporary critiques emerged after the end of his tenure (Marx' Civil War in France and Zola' s La Curée in 1871, Engels' The Housing Question in 1872). The strong critiques attached to the process of 'haussmannisation' also correspond to the consequences of the return of property owner influence over planning: proto-gentrification (Engels, 1942; Lefebvre, 2000; Merrifield, 2014; Smith, 1996) , the consolidation of urban capitalism (Benjamin, 2002; Harvey, 2006) or the forceful imposition of order over a city (Pinheiro, 2002; Scott, 1998) .
My aim here is to follow in the footsteps of the reconsideration of certain aspects of Haussmann's work in Paris carried by studies of urban history in France, most notably François Loyer's discussion of the surprising balance of the Haussmannian architectural system (Loyer, 1987) , and Florence Bourillon's detailed work on Parisian industrial quarters which tempers the usual association of the public works with worker displacement (Bourrillon, 1996) . Here, the focus is on Haussmann's strategic approach to the use of planning law to align the public works with the interests of SaintSimon's industrial class over those of idle property owners in a context of extreme wealth inequalities: in 1847 Paris, the richest 10% of decedents held 98.3% of total wealth, with a corresponding figure of 55.8% for the richest 1% -in comparison, these were respectively at 66.9% and 23.7% in 1994 (Piketty et al, 2006) .
The article starts by positioning Badiou as a thinker who is indebted both to Sartre for the focus on radical agency and to Plato for the existence of universal ideas able to mobilise this agency. The discussion then moves to the progression in Badiou's thought from thinking about being to thinking about appearing. This move has important implications. As far as being-there is concerned, events are 'thinned down': instead of an ontological rupture, they are the restructuring of relations between objects in a particular local situation, however large or small this 'world' may be. The second implication is that events are no longer defined in relation to the state. Instead, events can either occur against the state or through the use of state power. This makes it possible, through the figure of the state revolutionary, to think of 'planning events'. The article's latter half is concerned with fleshing out one possible such event, Haussmann's use of Saint-Simonian ideas early in his tenure to break the hold of property owners over planning. It starts with a brief summary of the account of Haussmann's early years in Paris developed in ANON (2016). This is followed by an introduction to the thought of Saint-Simon, the utopian socialist whose (Badiou and Milner, 2012: 104) . The crucial term here is that of 'construction', one which depends on the actions of subjects. What Badiou calls the materialist dialectic is the historical to and fro between moments of normality in which human animals are structured as bodies and languages and those unique moments when they refashion this normality in the name of a truth.
The crucial concept of Badiou's project is thus the notion of 'subject': "in the long-run, the theme of the subject unifies my intellectual undertaking, against those who define (post)modernity by the deconstruction of this concept" (Badiou, 2009: 522) . It is the subject (called faithful) which identifies the possibilities opened up by an occurrence (the site) and which works to construct a truth. For
Badiou, a truth is visible in the actions of the faithful subject, as it articulates "four determinations:
will (against socioeconomic necessity), equality (against the established hierarchies of power or wealth), confidence (against anti-popular suspicion or the fear of the masses), authority or terror (against the 'natural' free play of competition)" (Badiou, 2009: 27) . The notion of determination should be understood here as the condition of being determined, as a synonym of resoluteness. It is in this sense that a truth is a construction, a practice, forged in a particular world (Badiou's term for a local, bounded, situation).
To construct this truth, the faithful subject draws inspiration from an ideational framework circulating at the time of its constitution. The framework which structures a subject's truth is what Badiou, drawing on Lazarus (1996) , calls a historical mode of politics. This corresponds to a historical sequence in which a singular political thought is deployed. Examples include: the revolutionary (1792-1794), the classist (1848-1871), the Bolshevik (1902 Bolshevik ( -1917 and the dialectic modes, pinned to the respective figures of Saint-Just, Marx and Engels, Lenin and Mao (Lazarus, 1996: 90-91) . The faithful subject is thus that entity which uses a 'spirit of the times' to construct a practice able to effect a change in the local structure of appearances. (Shaw, 2010: 438) . In contrast, the notion of the 'site' in Logics of Worlds is that moment when the "the non-represented reveal their existence from the desert of inexistence" (Shaw, 2010: 439) -there is no prescription as to whether this non-represented object is to be found within or outside of the state. An event is simply a reversal of the structure of appearances by which the inexistent in a world becomes maximally existent (Badiou, 2009: 377) .
The second step is the split of the faithful subject into two types, distinguished by their relation to the state: the mass rebel (which he sees in Spartacus, Müntzer or Tupac Amaru) and the state revolutionary (as, for example, Robespierre, Lenin and Mao). Badiou explains in a long note in Logics of Worlds (Badiou, 2009: 518-522 ) that the state revolutionary should be understood as that subject which tries to "enact the separation between the state and revolutionary politics, with the added tension that it tries to do so from within state power" (Badiou, 2009: 521 (Badiou, 2017: 192 (Badiou, 2011: 174) .
From the perspective of the structure of appearances, an event occurs whenever subjects, by constructing and mobilising a truth, effect the reversal of this structure.
What is important is not only that this definition is detached from the state, but also that it is in a sense detached from a prescribed scale. This is linked to the flexibility of the concept of world, "the place in which objects appear" (Badiou, 2009: 598) , and the staging ground for an event. Badiou provides a number of examples of worlds: for the Paris Commune, "Paris at the end of the FrancoPrussian war of 1870" (Badiou, 2009: 363) ; for the appearance of serialism, "German music at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth" (Badiou, 2009: 79) ; or simply "the slow constitution of a demonstration at the Place de la République" (Badiou, 2009: 199) . For Badiou, a world is a local situation defined by a logic which ties all objects within it together. What is important is that "each world has its own envelope, and this is an immanent guarantee that there is never a total 'universe' but an infinite amount of worlds" (Shaw, 2010: 437) . A world is thus a bounded and structured set of objects which can be potentially restructured by an event. So while
Badiou uses examples of momentous transformations when discussing events, there is nothing in the logical system he develops that imposes a minimum scale on events.
There are in fact only two conditions in Logics of Worlds for a change in the structure of appearances to be considered an event: (1) it must effect a reversal of the structure of appearances, and (2), this reversal must be driven by a subject pushing forward a truth articulating the four determinations of will, equality, confidence and authority.
While these determinations will be discussed in more detail in the empirical section below, it is worth looking at the notion of equality a bit more closely here. This is because this determination is the one which allows for a distinction between Badiou's 'events' and other, less progressive, significant changes to the social order. There are two conceptions of equality in Logics of Worlds. (Badiou, 2009: 560) . This conception of equality is that it be assumed in all political action, but without it being the explicit goal of the political sequence. Setting up equality as the goal of a political sequence would be to acknowledge that equality did not yet exist, that it was distant state that one hopes will one day be attained. Against this, Rancière states that equality is "a point of departure, a supposition to maintain in every circumstance. Never would truth speak up for it. Never would equality exist except in its verification and at the price of being verified always and everywhere" (Rancière, 1991: 138) .
This conception of equality, drawn from Rancière, can be contrasted with another present in an illustration of the determinations in Logics of Worlds. Here, equality "means that everyone is referred back to their choice, and not to their position" (Badiou, 2009: 26) . This conception is closer to the phrasing of the determination 'equality': against the established hierarchies of power or wealth. This vision of equality is clearly less concerned with 'verification' and more with a course of action destined to force its realisation: "state revolutionary subjectivity is identified as an implacable struggle against the factions that arise from wealth or hereditary privilege" (Badiou, 2009: 26) . This framing of the determination equality as a course of action will be privileged in what follows: it is line with Badiou's focus on the 'subject as organised action' (as opposed to Rancière's 'subject as disruption') and provides a more concrete way to gauge the 'evental' nature of a course of action.
These two conditions -reversal of the structure of appearances, course of action marked by the determinations -make it possible to move away from the discourse of the exceptionality of the 'political'. From this perspective, events occur whenever a political practice, at any scale, brackets out structural constraints through actions that carry an affirmation of equality. Badiou's Logics of Worlds thus opens up a number of analytical possibilities. The one that is of interest here is that it enables an application of his work to the domain of planning -one which pursues goals that are at times antithetical to demands of the market and in which actions usually originate from within the state apparatus. This a view on planning that sides strongly with antagonism and which thus shares the critique of consensus-seeking developed in work drawing on Chantal Mouffe (Bond, 2011; Hillier, 2003; Pløger, 2004) . However, it is not a view that either seeks to move from antagonism to agonism (Pløger, 2004) or which aims for 'reciprocity' between adversaries (Bond, 2011) . Seeing planning through Badiou shifts the focus to pure antagonism inscribed in an 'evental' temporality. While Badiou's writings emphasise decisive action and in general tend to abstract from the 'messiness' of actual political situations, his concept of the subject offers the flexibility needed to analyse a range of political situations. This is because his concept of the subject is purely formal: not an individual but that which adopts a particular stance towards the truth of an event. This has led
Badiou to insist that the category of the subject must be thought without that of the individual:
when part of a subject, all individuality is lost, only the positioning in relation to the truth matters. It thus includes all of the actors (individuals, institutions, organisations, etc.) which drive the construction of a truth in a particular world. This points towards a way to accommodate features of contemporary planning situations in his events: issues of governance, diffuse responsibility for change, hybrid governance arrangements in which the public sector may not be the only institutional actor involved, etc.
A Badiousian perspective thus turns the spotlight towards attempts by particular planning apparatuses to effect a reversal of the structure of appearances existing in a particular place by pushing forward a truth with universal, egalitarian, resonance. The possible connection with particular episodes of planning will be fleshed out in the next section through the example of This conflictive relationship between Haussmann and property owners culminated in a number of legal setbacks Haussmann suffered in the late 1850s in the Council of State, France's supreme court of appeal for administrative law courts. The consequences of these defeats in the courts can be found in many texts on the public works (Benevolo, 1967: 135-136; Gaillard, 2000: 28-30; Hall, 1998: 737-738; Harvey, 2006: 131-133; Roncayolo, 1983: 114) . The roots of this conflict can be found in
Haussmann's use of the possibilities of the 1807 law to the full. Passed under Napoleon I's Empire, the 1807 law gave the planning authority strong tools to modify the urban fabric through the drawing up of 'plans d'alignements'. Once approved, these plans could be used to justify the piercing of new streets and the widening of old ones (Sutcliffe, 1981) . It also placed the powers of expropriation in the hands of the executive, not the judiciary. In practice, however, the 1807 law quickly came under attack in the legislature and the courts and never received full application.
Haussmann sought to bring back the 1807 law by first pushing for the strict application of its street widening clauses. He refused property owners all repairs or renovations to buildings that were not on the proper alignment, regardless of how long the particular alignment invoked had been ignored.
For him, this was the only way to guarantee the effectiveness of this gradual approach to street improvement. The stricter the municipal authority was on the kinds of repairs that should be considered as reinforcing a property, the more quickly the state of the properties would deteriorate and the more quickly the property owners would have to destroy or pull back their properties.
As concerns street creations, Haussmann was applying, and even strengthening, the 1807 law whose street creation clauses had been severely defeated by property owners. The intervening jurisprudence laid out a series of administrative steps that needed to be taken between the moment when the public became aware of expropriation plans for their neighbourhood and the moment at which the expropriation of their particular property would be consumed. During this time,
Haussmann forbade property owners in the zone to be expropriated from making any changes to their properties that could be seen as adding to their value, even if they were on the proper alignment. This was the case from simple projects decided with the Emperor to expropriations just about to be officially decreed: once the plan had been decided, it was illegal to build or rebuild on the wrong alignment.
Haussmann's planning practice in the 1853 to 1859 period can thus be seen as an attempt to take planning power back from property owners by resuscitating legislation which had become dead letter or rendered impotent by property owner influence on the courts. This practice -centred on suppressing and controlling property owner attempts at speculating on the public works -was shortlived: his interpretation of the planning law was defeated by the court cases mentioned above.
While Haussmann pushed on with the public works in the 1860s, without the backing of planning law (or of the Interior Minister) these became a source of speculative profit for property owners and developers -a fact well documented by contemporaries and which is encapsulated in the term 'haussmannisation'. The focus here is on Haussmann's early planning practice because of its interesting parallels with the thought of the utopian socialist Saint-Simon. These will be drawn out after a short presentation of Saint-Simon's ideas.
SAINT-SIMON
Saint-Simon's writings were concerned with diagnosing the situation of France in the early years of the Bourbon Restoration. For him, the uncertainty of this period -which followed the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire -was a chance to push forward a new mode of social organisation that would put France's productive class at centre stage. This class, which he calls the industrialists, must be understood as all of those working to produce things useful to society: factory owners and their workers, those involved in agriculture or trade, as well as artists and scientists. The 25 million industrialists thus made up the vast majority of the French population, outnumbering the other members of society -nobles, aristocrats, the legal sphere, the clergy -by a factor of 50 to 1.
The problem for Saint-Simon was that while this small group of non-industrialists controlled the most important administrative and ministerial positions it was not contributing to society in any 
HAUSSMANN AS A SAINT-SIMONIAN STATE REVOLUTIONARY
Haussmann's early planning practice inverted the way in which the world of Parisian planning had been structured: planning power was taken back from property owners. It can thus be considered to be a 'planning event' driven by all the planners, surveyors, administrators, architects, building companies, financial institutions, property developers and others who formed the 'Haussmann' subject. This 'evental' reading of Haussmann's work is in stark contrast to authors who consider it to be a logical continuation of existing planning thought rather than a radical novelty (Bowie, 2001; Papayanis, 2004) . Within this event, Haussmann's planning administration can be seen as one of Badiou's state revolutionaries, inscribed within a Saint-Simonian historical mode of politics, an important ideational framework at the time of Haussmann's work in Paris. The focus here will be on showing the way in which Haussmann's planning practice was dependent on this Saint-Simonian worldview. This will be done by fleshing out the links between Haussmann's planning practice and Saint-Simon's writings through the four determinations which ground the actions of Badiou's state revolutionary (will, equality, authority and confidence).
WILL -AGAINST SOCIOECONOMIC NECESSITY

Individuals "must propose as the goal of all their endeavours, of all their actions, to improve as quickly and as completely as possible the physical and moral existence of the largest social class"
(Saint-Simon, 1825: 3).
Contrary to accounts of the public works which emphasise security rationales -"the true goal of 
I do not know whether the government would deem it important to possess a second Champ de Mars; this is an issue that is not under my responsibility".
It also does not seem as though the aim of these first years of the public works was to extract as much value from the built environment as possible, or to free capital from its feudal straitjacket (Harvey, 2006: 108 (Choay, 1996: 274 ). Haussmann's focus was to improve the overall functioning of the city 'as quickly and as completely as possible'.
For Haussmann, Paris was facing an urgent problem: the city's population had outgrown its urban fabric. This was the source of the other difficulties facing Paris, be it congestion, cholera or unsafe housing. Haussmann was only identifying a problem that was linked to the wider transformations of 19th century France: industrialisation, urbanisation, migration, etc. (Agulhon and Choay, 1983) . But his contribution is the elaboration of a planning practice that was meant to offer a solution to this problem. Badiou's will here can thus be understood as Haussmann's attempt to regulate the actions of property owners so as to be able to regularise the urban fabric and improve the city for the industrial, productive, class.
EQUALITY -AGAINST THE ESTABLISHED HIERARCHIES OF POWER OR WEALTH
"The industrial system rests on the principle of perfect equality; it stands against the constitution of any birth-right and any type of privilege" (Saint-Simon, 1823-24: 57).
Haussmann's early planning practice constituted a complete reversal from the situation under the July Monarchy (1830-1848). In that period, planning was beholden to property owners: "the figures of the property owner and of the tax payer (often the same person) inspire the utmost respect" (Roncayolo, 1983: 97) . In the first half of Haussmann's tenure, property is no longer sanctified.
Access to the powerful and property wealth, instead of enabling a dismissal of planning, becomes an incriminating factor that calls greater attention from the planning apparatus. In the midst of the public works, only those with enough property wealth had the means to speculate by building or renovating on the path of a future boulevard. Assuming the equality of all Parisians in the realm of planning meant that the planning apparatus had to attack two mechanisms through which wealthy property owners were able to bypass planning injunctions.
The first was the Civil Buildings' Council ('Conseil des Bâtiments Civils') which offered architectural guidance in the context of public building commissions and public works projects. 
AUTHORITY -AGAINST THE 'NATURAL' FREE PLAY OF COMPETITION
In the industrial system, equality "consists in individuals drawing from society benefits in exact relation to their social outlay, that is to their real capacity, to the valuable use of their resources, among which must be understood, of course, their assets" (Saint-Simon, 1821: 206).
Benefits can be received from society only in proportion to what one contributes to it. If no contribution is made through one's work, then one is not entitled to "benefit from all the improvements of industrial work" (Saint-Simon, 1819a: 355). Given that property owners are not producers, and are thus not contributing useful work or resources to society, they are not entitled to benefit from public policies aiming to improve the conditions of the 'most numerous class'. For
Haussmann, property owners had to submit to construction freezes, refrain from speculating on the creation of new streets through urban fabric and accept to pull back properties on the wrong alignment. Authority is thus exercised through the state's capture of the returns on the public works to fund further work of general interest -as opposed to a focus on wealthier areas or a speculative free for all.
Haussmann's authority is clearly visible in his letters to the Minister of Interior. He had to constantly defend his principle of automatic construction freezes once the path of a new street to cut through existing fabric had been decided. If this practice were put into question, speculation on the public works would be rampant. He explains this to the Minister in a 1857 response to a property owner 
This occurs frequently on the path of planned streets and deserves to severely prosecuted".
Haussmann also had to defend decisions in which property owners were forbidden to consolidate buildings on the wrong alignment. This was also an occasion to condemn the actions of property This account of Haussmann's heavy hand when dealing with property owner attempts to bypass his planning injunctions clearly contrasts with accounts of the public works which highlight the "authorities' basic unwillingness to disturb private interests" (Sutcliffe, 1981: 134) and which assert that Haussmann's "personal views were strictly conservative" (Benevolo, 1967: 134 (Badiou, 2009: 25) . Within the Saint-Simonian framework, the words 'people' and 'masses' can be replaced by the notion of the industrial class, since this class encompasses the vast majority of the population. The aim of his writings is to free this class from the influence, and predation, of the non-productive elements of society. Once free, this class will be able to develop, "without barriers and to the fullest extent possible, a worldly or spiritual capacity useful to the group" (Saint-Simon, 1821: xiij).
CONFIDENCE -AGAINST ANTI-POPULAR SUSPICION OR THE FEAR OF THE MASSES
Haussmann's public works can thus be understood as a means to tear down the constraints on the activity of the industrial class imposed by the small, tortuous and congested central Parisian streets.
In a 1857 letter to the Minister of the Interior, Haussmann highlights that the 'right and duty' of the municipal administration "is to implement all improvements to the city's old plans that are called for by the new needs of traffic and circulation". This lends credence to Giedion's (1943) view that
Haussmann was the first planner to see the importance of the city itself to the development of industry; as he says it, Haussmann "wished to make Paris the first of the great cities to be brought into conformity with the industrial age" (Giedion, 1943: 469) . However, this does not mean that Haussmann was willing to let some property owners profit from the public works. If property owner suggestions fit with his agenda for the city, he thought they should bear a large proportion of the costs associated with opening the new street, as it would lead to a large increase in the value of their land, a benefit that should be used as leverage to get them to contribute. This can be seen in his analysis of one of these suggestions in 1857:
" These conditions were designed to turn initiatives that were in the private interest into something beneficial for the city by controlling the profit made by property owners wishing to speculate and by making investments in the public realm a necessary counterpoint to individual gains emerging from the public works.
It is clear from the four determinations above that Haussmann put into practice in the world of Parisian planning a Saint-Simonian mode of politics -at least in the first half of his tenure when he was able to 'get away' with his strategic approach to the use of planning law. His planning practice was predicated on demanding from property owners the contribution to society that the large benefits they extracted from the public works required. Haussmann's work is that conflict is inherent to planning practices that seek to displace logics that fix inequality.
CONCLUSION: THE PLANNER AS STATE REVOLUTIONARY
Through the lens of the state revolutionary, Haussmann's planning practice is a localised answer to a problem still relevant today: how to articulate confidence and authority within planning practices aiming to reverse deep structural inequalities? Haussmann's actions drew on Saint-Simonian ideas, a mode of politics appropriate to the time and place in which he faced this problem. Other subjects, in different worlds, will develop answers in a mode which allows them to coherently articulate the four determinations that drive their course of action. A mode of politics is thus both historical and geographical: it is the 'way of doing politics' existing ideationally in a world which is the most useful to the subject trying to force through an unequal state of affairs. A mode of politics consequently does not pre-exist the subject: the ideational base may exist, but the specific articulation of these ideas to political practice is a creation of the subject. The question is: what could a planning practice that follows a state revolutionary approach look like today?
The ideas developed by Badiou in Logics of Worlds are thus an opportunity to expand the discussions on the relation between planning and work on the notion of post-politics. The thinning of the category of event it proposes and its indifference to the placement of the state undermines a number of distinctions at the core of these discussions: 'grandiose' vs. 'minimal' politics (Marchart, 2011) , the heroic vs. the anti-heroic (Beveridge and Koch, 2017) or emancipatory struggles vs the state (Swyngedouw, 2017) . This thinned down event can be empirically investigated whenever a political practice, at any scale and from whatever place, brackets out structural constraints through actions that carry an affirmation of equality. This opens the door to the comparative (trans-worldly) study of 'planning events'.
There are a number of points of correspondence between these 'planning events' and the work on planning and power. Badiou's events can be seen as a particular response from planners to operating under conditions of large structural distortions in the power available to different interest groups. In such contexts, "identifying and supporting an actual force with the potential to effect major political-economic change is crucial" (Forester, 1984: 29) . A 'planning event' approach likewise brings together "the power of the bureaucracy with a predisposition to utilize it aggressively for the alleviation of socioeconomic disparity" (Kiernan, 1983: 82) . In this framework, planning events provide a means to evaluate the course of action taken by public planners: what differentiates a genuinely political course of action from a post-political one is the attempt at reversing the structure of appearances by making what was formerly inexistent (those at the receiving end of the inequality) maximally existent. It is possible that given the entrenched power of private interests, more forceful action than a "repertoire of mediated-negotiation strategies" (Forester, 1987: 312) or 'critical pragmatism' (Forester, 2012 ) may be needed. What distinguishes these events from other ways out of post-political conundrum is the essentiality of antagonism (vs Mouffian agonism) and the primacy of organised action (vs Rancièran disruption).
While Mouffe (2009) has called for a 'critique of engagement' with the state -"we have no other choice but to engage with hegemonic practices, in order to challenge them" (Mouffe, 2009: 235) - this is dependent on achieving a state of agonism: "a real confrontation, but one that is played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries" (Mouffe, 2013: 9) . The central concern thus seems to be the legitimisation of pluralist democracy. In contrast, for Badiou, the aims of a course of action, if they mobilise an articulation of the four determinations, relativise the means through which this change is achieved. This comes out quite clearly from his description of the affect 'justice' which drives the actions of the political subject, an affect which Oosterlynck, 2014: 94) . The difference with Badiou's event thus hinges on the notion of organisation.
As noted by Bassett, both Rancière and Badiou "agree that real politics must also be a mode of radical subjectivization, but Badiou's criticism is that Rancière fails to see that any such subjectivization must also be an organized and disciplined process" (Bassett, 2016: 282 ). Badiou's focus on organised action -be it in the case of the mass rebel or the state revolutionary -provides a different way out of the 'post-political condition' in planning. Here, the focus is on organising planning practices around a coherent articulation of the determinations.
A Badiousian 'planning event', pushed through by a state revolutionary, thus distances itself both from agonism and from pure disruption. It should not however be seen as identical to the 'purification approach' which "proposes a new society devoid of power, inequality and politics" (Van Puymbroeck and Oosterlynck, 2014: 93) . Badiou is keenly aware that any event will call forth reaction and is ultimately short-lived. The essence of his materialist dialectic is precisely this historical to and fro between events and the re-establishment of unequal structures. His work is thus a call to constantly push back this normality of inequality by joining a political subject.
